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Abstract 
The standard view that the absence of property rights is inefficient contradicts the Coasean 
proposition that the relative efficiency of different institutions depends on their ability to 
economize on transaction costs. Moreover, the comparative theory of open access and private 
property institutions fails to recognize the intermediate institution of common property, finesses 
dynamic optimization, and provides an incomplete account of governance. We provide a 
comparative statics framework for alternative modes of resource management, albeit one that 
allows for dynamic optimization, and show that open access can be efficient under conditions of 
low population pressure. We show that the intensification of production with population pressure 
in Hawaii co-evolved with specialization and increased governance, in accordance with the 
efficiency theory. Instead of market-based specialization, however, economic organization in 
pre-contact Hawaii was hierarchically determined via top-down management of the ahupua´a.  
 
1. Introduction 
Lack of academic convergence regarding the causes of changing property rights stems in part 
from the lack of a formal structure (see e.g., Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict, and Law, 
edited by Terry L. Anderson and Fred S. McChesney).  Drawing from the Hawaiian record, we 
hypothesize that property coevolves with governance, which increases with the intensification 
and specialization of production. The centerpiece of the theory is a simple comparative statics 
framework generalized from resource economics.  We show how increasing scarcity of marine 
resources leads to more and broader governance and greater resource use restrictions, if 
enforcement mechanisms are also free to evolve.    As Hawaii moved from small isolated 
villages to a unified kingdom and finally to U.S. territorial status and eventual statehood, old and 
new institutions, some of which were imposed, overlapped. The experience provides an 
intriguing opportunity to study the natural evolution of property rights as both resource pressures 
and relative prices change over time.   We will characterize the institutions of governance for Hawaii’s fisheries from early 
settlement to contact with the Western world and explain the changes, to the extent possible, 
with the second-best theory of economic organization. Western contact brought increased 
pressure on fisheries resources. We will show how the intermediate institution of the ahupua´a 
economy – centralized decision-making and control in each, somewhat independent valley – 
evolved as an effective institution for common property management before Western contact but 
was ultimately not well suited to the extensive trading taking place within the Islands and with 
the visiting ships after contact.   
1.1 The changing institutions of resource governance 
  In the canonical theory (North and Thomas, 1973, and Demsetz, 1967), private property 
is thought to generate unambiguously higher benefits than open access to resources such as 
grazing or hunting lands.  Moreover, it was thought that once the efficiency benefits of the 
institutional change were greater than the enforcement costs, the institutional change would be 
effected (Demsetz, 1967; Anderson and Hill, 1975). Later, Ostrom (1990) and others showed 
that it was theoretically possible that common property (distinguished from open access by its 
well-defined rules of access and management) could achieve efficient allocation. She also 
reviewed substantial evidence suggesting that common property regimes were often effective at 
resource conservation.  Taken together with Hardin’s (1968) classic paper, these studies illustrate 
a generalized version of the Coase Theorem, to wit, transaction and agency costs aside, 
decentralized, centralized, and intermediate institutions are all capable of achieving Pareto 
optimality, i.e. first-best efficiency.   
In the Coasean paradigm, however, first-best efficiency is only a point of departure for 
comparative institutional analysis. What is needed is a conceptual framework capable of 
generating propositions and explanations regarding which institution is second-best efficient 
under what circumstances.
1  The advocates of private property (Demsetz), public property 
(Hardin), and communitarianism (Ostrom) all implicitly agree that the relative efficacy of these 
institutions rests primarily on their ability to control the free-rider problem. Through the looking 
glass of Hawaiian history, we suggest that the theory of economic organization and institutional 
                                                 
1 This use of second-best follows Dixit (1996).  He subsumes rent-seeking, corruption, and other elements of 
political economy is his theory of the 3
rd-best. 
 
  2 change must be developed beyond this narrow focus.  In particular, the theory must explain the 
stylized fact that governance increases with specialization and the intensification of production. 
It must also be capable of explaining the non-monotonic relationship between these and the 
centralization of control, i.e. the governmental Kuznets curve.  
2.  Historical background  
  The co-evolution of governance and property with respect to marine resource scarcity can 
be clearly illustrated by considering two distinct periods in Hawaiian history, pre-Western 
contact and post-Western contact, each divided into sub-periods wherein property structures, 
governance, and scarcity pressures changed. The pre-contact period is divided into 4 eras: (1) 
Colonization, (2) Developmental, (3) Expansion, and (4) Proto-historic.  The post-contact period 
is divided into 3 eras: (1) Unification, (2) Independent kingdom, and (3) U.S. territory/state. 
2.1 Pre-contact overview 
   For some time after the Polynesians arrived in Hawaii (roughly 400 A.D.), an ´ohana 
(community management) system evolved wherein the patriarchs of each extended family 
governed production, including the construction and harvesting from fishponds. This 
colonization period is characterized by extremely low populations, the introduction of new 
agricultural products (e.g., pigs, taro), and the slow subsequent transformation of the most fertile 
valleys, adjacent to superior fishing grounds, into populated communities. Marine resource 
pressures were low, and though the kapu system’s origins must have traveled to Hawaii from 
earlier Polynesian settlements, implementation and enforcement were low (Kirch, 1996).   
  3 Figure 1: Timeline for Hawaiian resource use and development
(Adapted from Kirch (1985), p. 300-1
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  As populations grew and became more permanent in the Developmental era, governance 
by family eventually extended to governance of the entire ahupua´a valley, under a single chief 
or ali´i.  The chief allocated land and labor to their uses and began to take advantage of the top-
down power to achieve economies of scale and increased production intensity through 
  4 specialization, building large-scale irrigation projects and fish ponds in particular.  This system 
of control evolved into an extensive hierarchy during the Expansion era and eventually 
crystallized during the proto-historic period (1650-1785), at the height of the islands’ population, 
exhibiting a much higher degree of social hierarchy, specialization, and governance structure 
than in other parts of Polynesia (Abbott, 1992; Handy and Handy, 1991).  
  Figure 1 summarizes available archeological and proto-historic evidence on the timing of 
Hawaiian cultural development.  The acceleration of population growth, particularly from 1200-
1650, was followed by the intensification of food production, including irrigation and fishpond 
development. The social hierarchy was also growing increasingly structured at this time. This 
accords with our hypothesis that population pressure induces institutional change, including 
increased governance, which facilitates more intensive modes of production.   
  Table 1 summarizes the estimated populations at the beginning and end of each period, as 
well as the progression of indicators of the economic, material and hierarchical structures of the 
society during the period in question.  Throughout, we see evidence of increasing intensification 
of production both on land and at sea.  Technology becomes standardized, evidence of 
intermediate goods produced by a rising class of specialized adz-makers and   fishhook 
producers (Kirch, 1985, p. 184). As population increases, konohiki managers develop 
increasingly sophisticated irrigation
2 and communal fishing techniques, and fishponds are 
developed and evolve into true aquaculture
3, a unique Hawaiian development amongst 
Polynesian cultures, to increase productivity. Kinship networks give way to specialized skills in 
fishing and farming, managed by the konohiki.  Without external trade, hierarchical stratification 
increases, as do efforts at resource extraction for the benefit of the ali’i.  The commoners 
produce for the konohiki, who controlled the water supply, determined the land allocations for 
the commoners, determined fishing rights, and allocated ahupua’a resources for production, 
especially labor for communal projects. The konohiki’s duty to the ali’i was to meet an expected 
production goal to be presented during the makahiki festival, at which time the ali’i divided the 
                                                 
2 In particular, increased use of Type III irrigation systems, consisting of an irrigation canal running along the 
periphery of the field complex, allowing more sophisticated control of water distribution than was used in earlier 
Type II systems, where small groups of fields were watered by a single ditch that fed directly into the uppermost 
field. 
3 True aquaculture means that fish are bred and nourished in captivity; other Polynesian fishponds were holding pens 
fed by ocean tides. 
  5 tribute amongst his supporters in the chiefly class, including the konohiki.  This mechanism 
supported an increasingly stratified society.   
Table 1: Evolution of Specialization and Production 
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2.2 The ahupua´a system  
  7   The top-down management of the ahupua´a can be classified as common-property 
management, albeit more sophisticated than commonly described.
4 The ahupua´a provided 
everything “from uka, mountain, whence came wood, kappa for clothing, olona, for fish-line, ti-
leaf for wrapping paper, ie for rattan lashing, wild birds for food, to the kai, sea, whence came 
i´a, fish, and all connected therewith” (Davis, 1974, p. 124). Both internal economies, e.g. in 
fishpond construction, and external economies were exploited. The strong hierarchical control 
also allowed enforcement of conservation measures that reduced the depletion of natural 
resources. 
  The community worked under a gift-exchange system known as ko kula ‘uka, ko kula kai, 
where those upland traded with those on the sea.  This allowed considerable expertise and 
specialization to develop as evidenced by the highly developed knowledge and skill amongst 
both fishermen and planters, and kept most economic transactions within the ahupua´a.  The ali´i 
placed taxes on the maka´ainana (commoners) by requiring them to deliver commodities such as 
taro and to contribute labor, e.g. to the building of fishponds.  Enforcement of the hierarchy 
rested in part on brutality and fear of the wrath not only of the chiefs but also of the gods.  Both 
conditions enhance the benefits of common property rights as 2
nd-best (Deininger, 2003, p. 31). 
  Top-down management also allows the exploitation of benefits across ecosystem 
boundaries, not just within them.  Some of these benefits fit the standard theory, such as 
increased risk reduction.  However the ahupua´a system also provided the external economies of 
specialization and trade, e.g. between taro cultivators living on the plains and fishermen living on 
the coast.  (As discussed later, however, only external economies within the scope of the 
ahupua’a government could be readily exploited.) 
  The hierarchical system allowed exploitation of the external economies from 
specialization, given the existing avenues for trade, as well as internal economies in the 
production of particular goods.  Furthermore, the centralized control at the ahupua´a level 
satisfied the four requirements for viable common property rights outlined by Deininger (2003): 
(1)  Unambiguous property lines prevailed as ahupua´a generally followed watershed 
lines,  
                                                 
4 See e.g. the cases decribed in Ostrom, 1990.  
  8 (2)  Investment in irrigation and fishpond infrastructure exploited economies of scale and 
ecosystem enhancement, improving directly the lives of the people, 
(3)  Community property alleviated risks of enemy incursion and reduced idiosyncratic 
risks, and 
(4)   Planters and fishermen retained portions of their effort, reaping individual benefits 
from their productivity. 
  Deininger also notes that common property is more likely to succeed where group 
members have equal entitlements, e.g. roughly the same quantity and quality of farmland. This 
makes the more fundamental condition that costs of membership are roughly proportional to 
benefits contractually simple to specify. The case of the ahupua´a system affords a 
generalization, i.e. proportional taxation can also be efficient and readily administered where 
wealth is unequally distributed, provided that separate rules are specified for each stratum and 
the members of each stratum have roughly equal entitlements. 
  First, the top-down management of the meant that work and reward were not distributed 
equally across society, only within each stratum.  This facilitates a more general statement about 
the condition for successful common property management, namely that the allocation of costs 
conforms to the principle of benefit taxation, albeit within the prevailing system of vertical 
equity.   
2.3 The kapu system: enforcement of rights 
  This fear of a god witnessing the breaking of a kapu must have reduced enforcement 
costs but not eliminated them.  In 1824, C.S. Stewart noted in his published journal that he had 
seen a brackish fishpond “literally alive with the finest of mullet; the surface of the water is 
almost in a constant ripple from their motions; and hundreds can be taken at any time by a single 
cast of a small net.” He attributes this to the success of the kapu and the fact that no one of rank 
had lived there lately (Dieudonne, 2002, p. 105). Alternatively, a 19
th century Hawaiian historian 
wrote that pond caretakers could eat some fish species openly, “but others they would eat 
secretly” (Summers, 1964).   
  The earliest settlement sites (600-1100) were located in wet, windward areas with good 
fishing grounds.  Populations may have been very small, perhaps 100 people in an extended 
  9 ‘ohana (Kirch, 1996).  It is clear from bone pile analyses that pig and dog populations were 
growing rapidly over the time period and increasingly supplementing the fish protein collected 
from the sea. During the Expansion Period (1100-1650) population estimates increase to several 
hundred thousand, with some estimates as high as 800,000 (Kirch, 1985; Kame´eleihiwa, 1992).  
With this growth, overfishing from open access was a bigger problem, and governance increased 
within the existing institutional framework.  The chiefs limited access during certain seasons by 
placing a kapu (taboo) on fishing.
5 These kapu are generally associated with particular gods and 
variants of the system are known throughout Polynesia. The kapu were clearly conservation 
oriented; one of the most important kapu created alternating closed seasons for two species of 
primary import, ‘opelu (Mackerel scad) and aku (skipjack tuna).  Other kapu closed fisheries 
during spawning seasons in particular. 
2.4 Fishponds: a backstop resource 
  Credit for early construction of fishponds (mainly pre-13
th century) is veiled in the 
mythology of pre-contact Hawaii and demonstrates the difficulties in ascertaining the native 
population’s relation to its resources in the early pre-contact period.  Most early ponds are 
attributed to the menehune, or “little people,” who were said to have created great public works, 
particularly of irrigation (many still standing today), each in a single night’s work.  The identity 
of these individuals is an interesting mystery related to resource use in pre-contact Hawaii.   
Some believe that the menehune were early arrivals to Hawaii (c. 400 AD) from the Marquesas 
Islands, and that they were conquered and made to work for the later, physically larger arrivals 
from elsewhere in Polynesia (c. 1100 AD)
6. Whatever the truth, the man-hours actually required 
to construct these public works projects must have been considerable.  Construction of one of the 
                                                 
5 Fishponds may have been a response to this resource pressure not only as a source of increased production, but 
also as a social mechanism by which the ali´i could continue to consume fish during the kapu periods without 
“offending the gods.” Indeed, two main benefits arose from the ponds: (1) fish could be held and cultivated for easy 
access by the chiefs when desired, and (2) fish would be available to the chiefs during times of kapu, because the 
enclosure removed the area from the sea, which had the kapu, and placed it on land, from which the chiefs could still 
eat.  
6 This interpretation becomes more plausible in light of the fact that menehune is a permutation of manahune, or 
slave, in the Polynesian tongue from which Hawaiian is derived. 
  10 last new ponds on Molokai in the early 1800s took 10,000 men, and Summers (1964) estimates 
building of sizeable new ponds probably averaged a year.
7    
  Strict limited access to the ponds must have been essential, and governance measures 
increased accordingly. Only 30% of ahupua´a had associated fishponds (ponds never crossed 
ahupua´a borders), and the ponds’ total area of about 6650 acres would have produced 
somewhere between 1.75 million and 2 million pounds of fish per year – about 6 to 9 pounds per 
person per annum at the time of contact (Kikuchi, 1985; Hammon, 1975).
8  With little trading 
between ahupua´a, and the ability of the ali´i to reserve the catch for themselves, fishponds 
produced considerably greater sustenance for the higher levels of the social hierarchy with little 
direct benefit to the commoners.  Indirect benefits stemmed both from reduced fishing pressure 
on the coastal fisheries and from the increased fish population overall. The hierarchical ahupua´a 
system allowed the capture of the economies of scale necessary to develop these fishponds while 
the complementary kapu system provided the mechanism by which efficient harvesting could be 
enforced. Inasmuch as the ali´i captured the rents, this exemplifies a case in which the primary 
action group (Davis and North), undertake the institutional innovation in question. 
  From records of oral genealogical history, we know that populations must have been 
driven to create ponds as soon as there was sufficient labor available to do so, if appropriate 
environmental conditions existed. There are at least 6 fishponds constructed on Oahu and Kauai 
before the 13
th Century (Kikuchi, 1973).  Also at this time communities begin to develop in the 
drier, leeward valleys, suggesting population expansion and resource pressures.  The primary 
growth in fishponds is attributed to the 16
th Century (Kikuchi, 1973), as is the growth in 
population.  By the 18
th Century, repairs to existing ponds may have been as important as new 
construction.  The last ponds were constructed at the beginning of the 19
th Century, as Western 
contact and the resulting population decreases changed the social structure and manpower of the 
islands.  There were also more profitable opportunities for the ali´i developing in trade for other 
resources, particularly sandalwood. 
2.5 Changes in land tenure, fishing rights, and Western contact 
                                                 
7 As the ponds enhanced characteristics of the natural environment, there is no set size or dimensions for a fishpond.  
The ponds ranged from an acre in size up to 523 acres, and some walls were 1000s of feet long and several (up to 
18) feet thick, while many were much smaller. 
8 Population in the islands has been conservatively estimated at 200,000-225,000 in 1778, at contact. 
  11   While rent extraction by the chiefs was expected and accepted as the way of life, the 
hierarchical control included a mechanism for transferring these rents every generation in order 
to maintain consolidated support for the ali´i nui, or head chief.  This mechanism, the mahele, 
was a redistribution of rights that occurred with every change of top leadership.   The new ali’i 
nui reallocated the lands amongst his supporters, who in turn reallocated land amongst their 
supporters.  Commoners were free to move, and did so if the konohiki or ali’i mistreated them 
(Mitchell, 1992). The mahele enhanced the communal nature of the ahupua´a enterprise by 
lessening the import of developing capital that would not be transferable after a generation, and 
the ali´i and the landlords who managed the ahupua´a, the konohiki, acted more as stewards of 
the land than monopolists due in part to the fact they could lose their labor force to others if they 
did not appear fair.  
  King Kamehameha was a conservationist. Under his reign, three major fishpond projects 
were undertaken, and sandalwood trading with Westerners was carefully managed, for example.  
Being less adroit at governing the chiefs, however, Kamehameha’s successor Liholiho lost 
control of resource conservation at Kamehameha’s death.  Already weakened by his stepmother 
and regent’s (Queen Ka’ahumanu) transfer of loyalties, Liholiho was unable to consolidate his 
power through the traditional mahele mechanism and allowed existing chiefs to exploit 
sandalwood and other natural resources as payback for their fielty (LaCroix and Roumasset I).  
  Enforcement costs of the consolidated hierarchy increased under Liholiho. The 
introduction of new religious institutions (Christianity in particular) and the apparent impotence 
of the Hawaiian gods in protecting the population from Western diseases rendered the kapu 
system less effective and the system was officially abandoned in 1819.  (Kame’eleihiwa, 1992, p 
140ff).  
 As  the  mahele did not take place at the time of Liholiho’s succession, the former chiefs 
became entrenched.  A move toward higher productivity yields occurred (Khil, 1978). Of greater 
impact, however, following this relaxation of conservation and increase in rent-seeking by the 
lesser ali’i, the sandalwood resource was depleted by 1850, leaving not only a void in tradable 
goods, but also considerable environmental degradation to watersheds.  Thus the greater scarcity 
of extractable resources increased the benefits of conservation just as the hierarchical institution 
designed to protect them failed due to the increased costs of governance. 
  12   The hierarchical system of ahupua´a control was relaxed and the commoners received 
greater protection of property. In 1839 a Declaration of Rights limited the ability of chiefs to 
extract property from commoners. This appears to have been necessary because the ali´i were 
finding increasing benefit from the exploitation of the commoners as producers of goods that 
could be traded for the newly influential foreign goods and the status and power they conveyed 
(Kame´eleihiwa, 1992, p 205).   
  Throughout the process of consolidation, the responsibilities of the commoners changed 
little; each was expected to perform his farming or fishing duties under the control of the 
ahupua’a konohiki.  Two important trends evolved, however.  First, the commoners developed 
specialized skills (e.g. in taro and dryland farming and various fishing techniques), enhancing 
resource productivity while tying them more closely to the ahupua´a (Handy and Handy, 1991, 
p. 310ff).  Second, the konohiki’s role of manager evolved with increased responsibilities and 
specialized knowledge (e.g. organizing hukilau, irrigation and other communal activities). When 
the position of konohiki first emerged (during the expansion period), he was primarily a tax 
collector providing service for a superior ali’i in return for status and a portion of the harvests. 
By the time of the Great Mahele, his role had been gradually transformed into a position that 
claimed ownership of the resources, and the associated ability to make decisions. 
 The  ahupua´a extended into the sea, and property rights were also redefined and 
extended in coastal fisheries.  Fishing rights remained tied to the management of the land, and 
remained in the hands of the konohiki, ali´i and the king, with intent of balancing stewardship for 
the people with private goals.  While the fisheries were still common property, enforcement costs 
and benefits in coastal fisheries controlled directly by konohiki differed from those of the 
government controlled, open water fisheries, and the coastal, konohiki-managed fisheries. While 
government lands and their appurtenant fisheries quickly were opened to the public, the konohiki 
retained their rights to private use throughout the 19
th century. 
 The  konohiki (acting for the ali´i) could regulate fishing by monopoly reservation of a 
particular species and by seasonal restrictions.  He could collect in rents 1/3 of the harvests of 
open access fishes, for the benefit of the ahupua´a (Khil, 1978, p 10).  The rights belonged to the 
job of konohiki, not the man, and were not transferable, with the intent of maintaining incentives 
for stewardship.  The king also had the ability to set restrictions on non-transient shoal fishes and 
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benefit of the government (Khil, 1978, p. 11).     
  Throughout the 1840s, the Great Mahele and the changing constitutional rights slowly 
made more explicit the powers of the konohiki and the king and their portions of the take 
changed.  In 1841, the king’s take was reduced to 50%, and in 1845, the konohiki was given 
rights over the sea extending one mile from the beach at low water.  The catch was to be shared 
evenly with the tenants.  In 1848, Hawaiian property rights received their greatest institutional 
change under the Great Mahele.  Under increasing pressure from the growing Caucasian 
population, the land was permanently divided amongst the king (state), the ali´i and konohiki 
(ahupua´a) and the commoners, paving the way for transferable rights to land and sea.  It is at 
this time that the role of the konohiki seems to have changed from steward to owner
9.  
  From this period of history, we garner three potential trends in institutional evolution. 
First, each institutional framework has some flexibility in accommodating increased governance. 
Governance within an institutional system can respond to changes in resource pressures, albeit 
large changes in relative prices may occasion a transition to new institutions.  Second, 
institutions do not simply switch instantaneously from one form to another, even when they are 
seemingly imposed.  The example of the konohiki’s slow transition from a minion of the ali’i, to 
an incentive-driven resource owner, shows the shift from manager to owner that accompanies a 
shift from a common property regime to a private property one. 
  Over time, the organizational triangle got higher with consolidation, i.e. there were 
increasing layers of hierarchy and a more structured system of governance (e.g. more control by 
the priesthood and more elaborate kapu restrictions). Within the levels of governance, e.g. 
konohiki, the “managers” held more independence.  That is, the various players were not just 
passing down orders from the king; their own incentive systems were more developed. All 
fisheries didn’t follow this pattern, however.  Where the appurtenant fisheries became less 
                                                 
9 Though the Great Mahele ostensibly divided land in equal shares between the royalty, the chiefs and the 
commoners through the agency of the konohiki, the actual process of attaining title to fee simple property was 
complex, and in particular, required a commutation fee that resulted in a large portion of the chiefs’ lands being 
returned to the state in payment.  The commoners’ inability as a group to acquire much fee simple property stemmed 
from hurdles that included paying for land surveys and unfamiliarity with the system.  Fewer than 8421 parcels, 
averaging 3 acres in size, were in the end awarded to commoners, accounting for 28,658 acres of land, or less than 
1% of Hawaii’s land area (Kame´eleihiwa, 1992, p. 294).  The main beneficiaries of the Great Mahele appear to 
have been Westerners who could now obtain fee simple land.   
  14 valuable due to the development of other sources (e.g., fishponds), their organizations devolved 
towards open access, i.e. governance actually decreased.  








Figure 2: Hierarchy grows increasingly complex over time, but incorporates existing
systems.  The subsequent transition to decentralization relies on existing relationships (e.g.














  15   Over Hawaiian history, social organization went from family to hierarchy to more 
complex and larger hierarchy (vertical and horizontal expansion) to private.  Transitions were 
gradual, e.g. with some private property coexisting with hierarchies. Even the great Mahele, 
often historically billed as a quick transformation in 1848 from hierarchy to private property, 
took over a decade of governance expenses to settle, and was incomplete, i.e. it left much land 
and marine resources as forms of common property. 
  As mentioned, the monarch’s fisheries moved towards open access
10 while many of the 
konohiki, where governance provided valuable returns, adopted stricter enforcement policies.  In 
1858, tenants regained some legal ground in piscary rights with a court ruling that stated the 
konohiki rights were subject to the tenant’s rights, where tenants included all residents of the land 
(Khil, 1978). 
  The opening of state fisheries to the general public was explicitly an act to reduce 
enforcement costs on a low productivity resource.  The new law, enacted in 1850, read in part: 
  Whereas the fish belonging to the government are productive of little 
revenue; and whereas the piscary rights of the government managed by the fishing 
agents are a source of trouble and oppression to the people … all fish belonging to 
or especially set apart for the government shall belong to and be the common 
property of all the people equally … All fishing grounds pertaining to any 
government land, or otherwise belonging to the government, excepting only 
ponds, shall be, and are hereby, forever granted to the people for the free and 
equal use of all persons… (in Khil, p. 13) 
  This law increased pressure on the fisheries and resulted in the slow subsequent 
introduction of increased governance in the forms of gear restrictions, size restrictions, and 
seasonal restrictions.  In 1850, use of fish poisons was made a misdemeanor offense.  In 1872, 
use of explosives was restricted. This was presumably as much for the safety of the users as the 
preservation of the reef or fish, though in 1888 the possession of fish killed by dynamite was 
rendered enough evidence for prosecution.  In 1888 size restrictions were introduced for mullet, 
except for live use in stocking fishponds.  These restrictions were codified into the code of the 
Republic of Hawaii in 1893, while the konohiki retained their rights.  (Khil, 1978).   
                                                 
10 This is not to say that informal, non-governmental limitations of fishing rights did not exist. 
  16 2.7 Annexation and trade 
  Though the big picture of institutional change in Hawaii is one of increasing resource 
pressure accompanied by increasing governance and decentralization of control, at the level of 
individual resource assets, in particular coastal fisheries, we witness the richness of the model in 
explaining the connection between resource value and investment in governance.  Coastal 
fisheries varied in economic value both within a given time period and across time, as a function 
of the resources’ viability and the populations dependent on them.  When costs of maintaining 
property rights increased for the konohiki fisheries at the end of the 19
th century, responses 
varied according to economic benefits of the resource, with higher-valued fisheries commanding 
greater effort in the establishment of rights.  Furthermore, as time decreased the value of all 
coastal fisheries due to increasing international trade and the greater availability of preferred 
substitutes, governance over all coastal fisheries decreased.     
  After annexation in 1898, and shortly thereafter the passage of the federal Organic Act in 
1900, the konohiki fisheries came into conflict with federal law.  The Organic act repealed all 
exclusive rights, but left a two-year window during which holders of exclusive rights could 
register and adjudicate their private claim.  Any successful private claims could be condemned 
for public use, however, with allegedly proper compensation.  Of the more than 400 private 
fisheries at annexation, only 107 registered claims were made within the mandated window.  
More than half were on Oahu, with its greater population, closer proximity to the courts, and 
growing reliance on markets, factors which lowered the transactions costs associated with 
enforcement and increased the net benefits of conservation activities.   
  The registered fisheries also held greater assessed market value on average.  At least two 
attempts were made to value the konohiki fisheries, in part for use in condemnations
11.  The first, 
in 1939, described 349 konohiki fisheries, 101 of which were registered.  Table 3 summarizes 
their findings by island.  Kauai, Oahu and Molokai all generated greater than average value from 
the registered fisheries, while Maui actually received less.  In this assessment, no account was 
made for the role of biological growth in the capital stock of the fisheries.   
 
                                                 
11 The limited treasury of the new Territory was responsible for financing compensation for condemned fisheries, 
which limited their interest in doing so.  The development of Pearl Harbor led to the first real cases for 
condemnation. 
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Table 3: Relative value of registered fishery konohiki monopolies 







Percent of estimated 
value from registered 
fisheries 
Oahu  64  20,750  82.8  94.7 
Hawaii  148  14,800  5.4  5.4 
Maui  81  7,350  33.3  27.2 
Molokai  28  3,100  10.7  19.4 
Lanai  4  400  50.0  50.0 
Kauai  24  9,900  33.3  83.8 
Totals 349  56,300  28.9  56.0 
Data from C.C. Crozier, Deputy Tax Commissioner (Mar 14, 1939) 
  In 1947, another assessment occurred in which an attempt was made to include biological 
growth and catch effort (Khil, 1978).  These results tended to produce even lower valuations than 
the 1939 survey.  Many of the fisheries were seen as lacking commercial uses and their appraised 
values reflected this.  The most highly valued fishery, the 270-acre Kahana fishery on Maui, 
generated per-acre values of $37.04.  This fishery was operated collectively on a profit sharing 
basis, where all catches were divided 50/50 between owners and fishermen.  The lowest values 
were for less than twenty-five cents per acre.   
Table 4: Percent of catch by habitat type 
Year 
Coastal 
 (% of total) 
Neritic-
pelagic 
(% of total) 
Slope and 
Seamount 
(% of total) 
Pelagic 




1900  59.1  16.2  3.4  21.2  6157.8
1950 &1953 avg  4.8  3.4  4.0  87.8  17426.7
1985-6 avg  6.1  5.4  16.8  71.8  9868.0
2002-3 avg  1.3  2.5  5.8  90.4  23398.0
Sources: Shomura (1987) and State of Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources, Dept 
of Aquatic Resources (2004).
12 
  This institution might have played a greater role in the development of long-term 
fisheries law if its commercial importance had not dwindled over the century or if enforcement 
had been simpler.  Changing tastes, increased options for foods, and increasingly available open 
                                                 
12 Reporting for the 2002-3 period includes a slightly different composition of species that under-reports coastal 
fishes compared to earlier years.  However the important shift is clear: between 1900 and 1950, coastal fisheries 
dwindled in comparison to the expanding pelagic fisheries. 
  18 access fisheries all reduced the ability of this institution to function as a mechanism for 2
nd best 
provision.  Table 4 shows the relative change in coastal fisheries versus other Hawaiian fisheries 
over the century. 
  The simultaneous maintenance of private and open access fisheries in proximate space 
increased the cost of enforcement for the konohiki, and in many cases these higher enforcement 
costs outweighed the benefits.  The commercial value of the in-shore fisheries they held became 
increasingly limited for much of the 20
th Century.  Pressures for multiple uses of the areas led to 
some condemnations, and today, virtually all of the fisheries are operated under complex 
government restrictions, but open to anyone who conforms to those regulations.   
2.8 Stylized Facts 
  The evolution of economic organization, as illustrated by the simple case of Hawaii, can 
be characterized by the following trends.  As private property expanded, so did government 
responsibility.  Decision-making became first more centralized as the monarchy became 
established (1805) and then less so as it devolved, with a series of constitutions setting up 
legislative government beginning in 1840 and the privatization of lands under the Great Mahele 
at the end of that decade (Daws, 1974).  The scope and breadth of central government control, 
however, increased; these constitutions established a cabinet, a civil service, and an independent 
judiciary by 1847.  As the population of Hawaii expanded and resource pressures increased, the 
agents of this increasingly centralized control also intensified their governance efforts, imposing 
greater restrictions on the use of fisheries as well as developing and institutionally supporting 
stronger property rights for the coastal private fisheries.   
  Private decision-making within the new property rights system for fisheries continued to 
balance enforcement costs against benefits as well.  Konohiki sought to incur the costs of fishery 
registration when the asset was more valuable, leaving less valuable assets to open access. 
Enforcement declined across all coastal fisheries as the resource value decreased over time.     
  The scope of the economy broadened and specialization opportunities expanded, bringing 
greater benefit from decentralized control after Kamehameha I’s death. Kamehameha had 
worked to take skills from the Westerners and train his own people in newly important trades 
including shipbuilding and blacksmithing, to such a successful extent that at least one Western 
  19 carpenter refused to divulge his specialized knowledge for fear that there would be no role for 
Westerners in Hawaii (Daws, 1974, p. 49).    
  Governance efforts, however, did not abate; large investments were made in determining 
property rights and building the oversight mechanisms for enforcement needed after the 
abandonment of the kapu system.   In the 1840s, a series of constitutions instituted a judicial 
system and placed control over public goods, particularly education, in the hands of a 
representative legislature (Daws, 1974, p. 107).  Additionally, former managers within the 
hierarchy, like the konohiki, retained their management rights over resources like coastal 
fisheries, and the monarch maintained control of indivisible assets like fishponds.   
  Within every institutional framework from the first Polynesian arrivals to the present: the 
informal ohana network, localized chiefdoms, monarchy, territorial government, and state, 
governance efforts have increased in response to benefits of greater specialization, greater 
population pressures, and greater resource scarcity.   
3.  A capital-theoretic explanation 
  The objective of this section is to provide a framework for comparing the performance of 
institutions that govern resource use over time and to show how population pressure or changes 
in the net benefits of resource use can induce a change in the optimal institution. This requires 
first assessing the relative advantages and disadvantages of the organizational forms in question: 
central planning, decentralized decision-making, and centralized decision-making at the 
community level and then determining how population or other resource pressure affects the pros 
and cons of each institution. 
  A natural starting point for understanding the advantages and disadvantages of private 
property versus other institutions is provided by Anderson and Hill (1975): balance the first-best 
benefits of switching from open access to private property against the costs of enforcement, 
which are in turn equated with the cost of fencing.
13 Allen (2003) has suggested that this theory 
could be extended such that the second-best benefits of various management institutions can be 
weighed against the enforcement costs of those institutions, designating that institution with the 
                                                 
13 North and Thomas (1970) and Davis and North (1971) only recognize the political cost of changing the 
institution, not the enforcement, administration, and other organizational costs of the institution in question. 
Demsetz (1967) implicitly considers enforcement costs, but how they are to be balanced against benefits is unclear, 
especially since neither benefits nor costs are not well-defined (see, e.g. Anderson and Hill, 1975). 
  20 highest net benefits as the optimal one. Even this extended theory is incomplete. It implicitly 
assumes that the enforcement costs of a particular institution are clearly defined. This in turn 
suppresses the problem of determining, for a particular organizational form, how much and what 
form of governance is optimal. For the case of common property management, for example, the 
community must determine the rights and responsibilities of members, and choose an incentive 
structure as well as its technology of enforcement. Until this governance structure is specified, 
neither the benefits nor costs can be determined. 
  The three commonly proposed solutions to the open access problem are private property, 
common property, and public property. Comparing these institutions according to the extended 
Demsetz theory involves comparing known enforcement costs with the benefits that a particular 
institution delivers by reducing free-riding. This non-categorical theory has not successfully 
delivered useful categorical theories, however.
14 Rather, analysts are left with asserting that 
changes, such as the invention of barbed wire, increased the relative net benefits of a particular 
institution, thereby explaining its adoption. In other words, the benefits and costs of institutional 
change are not well-defined. This and other examples led Samuelson and Baumol to remark that 
the New Institutional Economics is not operational. In the present context, we seek a theory of 
why governance costs, both within and across institutional forms, increase with population 
pressure, specialization, and economic modernization. 
  Another conceptual weakness of property rights theory is its lack of capital theoretic 
foundations.  As an asset’s value increases, it is natural to expect that investments in protecting 
or enhancing its value will increase over time.  Anderson and Hill (1990) have provided a 
dynamic theory of a one-time investment in enforcement costs, e.g. building a fence, but have 
not considered the possibility of increasing governance-capital over time. In what follows, we 
exploit resource economics to provide this theory. 
    For the case of renewable and non-renewable resources, the first-best condition 
for optimal resource use may be written as:  
                                                 
14 See e.g. Vivian Walsh’s entry in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics for an illuminating discussion of 
categorical vs. non-categorical theories. 
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where P-c is the resource royalty, defined as the resource price minus its extraction cost; F(s) is 
the growth of the resource as a function of its own stock, F(s) = 0 for non-renewables; and r is 
the real interest rate.  Since the right-hand side of (1.1) is the marginal user cost, (1.1) states that 
optimal resource extraction is achieved when the marginal benefit (royalty) of resource use 
equals the marginal user cost.
15   
  For simplicity, we do not illustrate the possible dynamic paths that optimal resource use 
takes over time here (see e.g. Clark, 1990, for visual representation). Rather we describe the 
static first and second-best outcomes at different points in time to emphasize the shift in 
resources to compensate for the move to the second-best outcome.  Panel A of Figure 1 
illustrates first-best optimal resource extraction X*, in contrast to open access extraction which 
occurs where the marginal benefit, P-c, falls to zero (XOA), for a single time period.  Panel B 
reflects these curves’ mirror images to show clearly the marginal benefits (MBC) and marginal 
costs (MCC) of conservation of the resource in the form of reduced extraction, so that first-best 
optimal conservation is XOA- X*, where the marginal benefit of conservation equals its marginal 
cost.   
                                                 
15 See e.g. Pearce and Turner (1990). 











Figure 2:  A second-best theory of resource management




















  Now recognizing enforcement and other organization costs, we can see that second-best 
optimal enforcement is generally less than that of the first-best solution. First, define governance 
costs as the actual resources used up in the enforcement and organizational effort plus the 
shirking costs that remain.
16  Panel C shows the net marginal benefits of conservation (NMBC) 
and introduces the governance costs (MGC), which are assumed to increase with the level of 
conservation.  The net marginal benefit of conservation (MBC-MCC) is the marginal benefit of 
controlling resource use.  The optimum governance of resource extraction occurs where this 
                                                 
16 For the special case where the organization is a firm, governance costs are agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Roumasset, 1995). 
  23 marginal benefit equals the marginal cost of governance whether it be through socialism, 



















Figure 3:  A second-best theory of resource management:




























  This structure can be used to explain the co-evolution of governance and fisheries 
management.  As the curves shift to reflect population pressures and resource availability, the 
second-best optimal solution may change.  Figure 3 corresponds to the Hawaiian situation as 
population pressures increased resource pressures over time.  The tightening of the kapu system 
followed as the population grew and increased the marginal user cost of conservation.  Not 
shown explicitly here, but evident from the graph, is that when population is low and resources 
  24 abundant, little or no governance costs are warranted.  Indeed if resource use is sufficiently low, 
open access may be 1
st-best optimal, i.e. curves of figure 2 intersect in the negative quadrant.   
This corresponds to the early stages of Colonialization and Development, when governance was 
informal and managed through an ohana (family) network. 
  With even greater population pressure, intensification and resource depletion, however, 
potential gains from trade across districts increase (LaCroix and Roumasset, 1984) and the 
dictatorial hierarchies controlling each ahupua´a economy are not well suited to exploit those 
opportunities. If such potential gains are large enough to warrant the increased governance costs 
of further centralization of control (albeit not necessarily of decision-making), the second-best 
theory predicts that such institutional change will take place. At the time of Western contact, 
Hawaii was headed for just this sort of unification of control.   
  Another advantage of hierarchical government, however, lies in its ability to exploit 
internal economies of scale, e.g. in fishpond construction, external economies from the division 
of labor, and resource interlinkages, e.g. between watershed conservation and the maintenance of 
stream flows during drier months.  We witness these economies of scale exploited to develop 
fishponds for resource enhancement and conservation as resource pressures increased in the 
Expansion and Proto-historic periods. 
  Figure 4 translates figure 3, which is specified in terms of the marginal benefits and costs, 
into an agency cost framework, i.e. in terms of governance costs and the total costs of benefits 
foregone (see e.g. Jensen and Meckling 1976). In addition to agency costs, however, we include 
other departures from the first-best solution in the definition of total transaction costs (e.g., North 
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  These transaction costs will shift dynamically, e.g. in response to population pressure and 
the changes costs and benefits of specialization.  Figure 5 illustrates a shift in transaction costs 
within an institutional framework.  
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The graph describes a shift that stems from increased benefits from resource conservation due to 
increased population pressures and increasing external economies from enhanced trading 
opportunities. Increased benefits yield increased governance and tightening of control.  We 
expect that the dynamics will differ across institutional frameworks.  In the private property case, 
for example, additional benefits from specialization and external trade may be captured and 
governance may increase more rapidly than under hierarchy once fixed costs of developing the 
institutional framework are incurred.  This addresses in part the understanding that increased 
property rights will require greater third party support for the institutional framework itself 
through increased governance and investment in the framework itself.  
  In Figure 6, we examine the choice of institutional framework given the minimization of 
transaction costs within each framework.  Over time, transaction costs are increasing for all 
institutional structures, however they do so at varying rates.  Here, we illustrate the case for 
Hawaii, where in time period 1, transaction costs are minimized by choosing G1**, where 
hierarchy is the optimal institutional choice.  By time period 2, the benefits of hierarchy have  





Figure 6: Comparative institutional transaction cost analysis.
Transactions costs differ in magnitude and respond differently to increasing levels of
governance.  Here, TC1t approximate costs of hierarchical control where benefits
from internal trade quickly lower costs while the difficulties in achieving external
trade economies increase costs dramatically with governance.  TC2t curves
approximate private property, where institutional fixed costs raise and flatten agency








been reduced as population pressures increase the benefits of governance and the well-known 
burdens of central planning begin to show themselves.  Still, this may be preferred to making the 
switch to private property, with similar costs that would recommend a higher level of 
governance.  Finally, the burdens of managing hierarchy combined with the loss of ability to 
  28 achieve specialization from external economies increase transactions costs above the minimum 
transactions costs achievable by switching to private property.   
  We hypothesize that had Hawaii maintained independence as a kingdom longer after 
western contact rather than becoming part of the United States in the late 1890s, this 
centralization of control and decisions would have been unstable and failed to last (Glaeser & 
Shleifer, 2003).  Of the many Pacific Island kingdoms that developed via similar hierarchical 
processes to Hawaii, only Tonga remains a feudal monarchy today, and it is increasingly 
unstable, as population pressures that challenge longstanding mandates of land tenure (each male 
at age 16 is to receive 8.25 acres [U.S. Department of State Background Note, Tonga, 2003]) 
make it difficult to resist calls for democratic reform and devolution of power.   
  Figure 7 illustrates the efficient evolution of centralized control.  At first, centralization 
of control and decisions increase together, to reduce idiosyncratic risks through mutual insurance 
and diversification, and exploit economies of scale in production, e.g. in communal net fishing 
(hukilau). 
  Hawaii during pre-contact followed this pattern from the ohana network through to 
monarchy.  Just after contact, King Kamehameha I unified the islands under his control, bringing 
all the islands under one rule for the first time.  Almost immediately, however, pressures in the 
unwieldiness of this top-down management reduced the effectiveness of this unified control at 
conserving resources and exploiting economies of scale.  As the monarchy continued through the 
19
th century, the ali´i under the kings acquired increasing power and one of the chief potential 
benefits of unified control, stewardship of the resources, was traded for political support as 
governance costs were unsupportable.  Newly introduced goods from the West transformed the 
relative prices of resources, as particularly sandalwood increased in value.  The last investment 
in fishponds occurred in 1839.   













  We find that the second-best theory, which suggests that institutions will change when 
the net benefits to doing so are positive, is inadequate for explaining institutional change after 
Western contact.  While Kamehameha I was able to maintain conservation, rent-seeking 
prevailed in subsequent administrations such that conservation declined.   
  An additional inefficiency force increasingly apparent with Western rule was intellectual 
failure, including the failure be vigilant towards unintended consequences. More recent 
government policy follows Pigouvian logic quite well, despite Coase’s warnings about 
“blackboard economics” (Coase, 1994, ch. 1).  We provide a two-instrument Pigouvian policy 
for correcting dynamic open access inefficiencies that corresponds to the actual policies adopted.  
In addition to a Pigouvian tax (or equivalent quantity restriction) to move the non-cooperative 
solution to the optimum, a simultaneous subsidy of fingerling production and release can be 
derived. We describe this at greater length below. This blackboard analysis fails to consider 
voluntary solutions, however, and the subsidies undermined the development of private property 
through ocean-cage fish farming. 
 
5.  Summary and conclusions 
  30 As Hawaii’s population increased, production systems were intensified.  Social 
organization became increasingly complex, accommodating increasing division of labor. The 
increased vertical and horizontal specialization was facilitated by new incentive and governance 
structures summarized by the governmental Kuznets curve. Specifically, we witness a natural 
progression from a small, ohana network of reciprocal exchange, managed by a clan chief, to an 
increasingly stratified hierarchy and resulting in a monarchy in 1805.   With Western contact, 
relative resource values diverge greatly from the past, and a new path toward decentralization of 
decision-making begins while centralization of control is transferred from one institutional 
framework to another but continues to intensify, despite the decline of population.  With respect 
to marine property, this increasingly centralized control is evidenced in the increasing adoption 
of open-access fishing restrictions.  At the same time the government foregoes its previous rights 
to shares of the catch, which are dwindling in economic importance.  
Inasmuch as Western institutions were exogenously imposed, cannot be sure that 
hierarchical control would have eventually withered away and been replaced by market 
institutions. Considerable specialization and exchange was possible within the hierarchical 
system. The development of the position of konohiki as a specialized land manager and then its 
transformation into resource owner exemplifies the interdependence of specialized skills and 
productivity, which intensifies along with institutional change. 
Our explanations of these stylized facts provide an extension of the theory of property 
rights.  Chief among these are the dynamic foundations needed for a complete theory of second-
best resource management. We have also sketched a categorical theory explaining why, as the 
benefits of resource management increase with population pressure or other causes of 
specialization, governance costs increase both within and across institutions. A methodological 
point of possible interest is that second-best analysis cannot proceed without first-best analysis. 
Indeed this is implicit in Coasean analysis.  It is precisely the proposition that, absent transaction 
costs, different institutions are capable of the same first-best solution, which allows us to use the 
first-best solution as a benchmark against which the transaction costs of alternative institutions 
can be compared.
17 
                                                 
17 For this to be generally true, we must use transaction costs in its broadest sense, i.e. that transaction costs are the 
costs of running the economic system and are the equivalent of friction in physical systems (Williamson, 1985). 
  31 More specifically, with respect to alternative solutions to the open access problem, we 
have shown the following.  First, it is not necessarily a problem; open access can be the first-best 
solution.  This is the case in early Hawaiian history, when resource pressures were low, and 
though the kapu institution was available as it was brought with the first settlers, its use was 
expectedly minimal. Second, even if open access is first-best inefficient, it is not necessarily the 
case that open access is inferior to at least one of the three proposed alternatives; it can be 
second-best efficient. Indeed, we have suggested that there is a second-best transition, as the 
optimal degree of specialization increases, from open access to common property management to 
private property, which helps to explain the governmental Kuznets curve. 
The second-best theory of induced institutional change predicts an increase in 
conservation effort as population pressure and modernization deplete natural resources. Unlike 
previous theoretical frameworks, the suggested theory allows for changing resource extraction 
(or changing investment) over time.  We witness this increase in conservation effort in Hawaii 
along with institutional development that benefits from the ability of hierarchy to capture 
economies of scale in land and resource management, and then seeks to benefit from the change 
in relative benefits by decentralizing decision-making into the hands of the konohiki rather than 
the king. The increase in governance and the institutional change from open access to the 
intermediate ahupua´a system and later to a centralized system accord with second-best theory. 
Religion and brutal hierarchical control were used effectively to enforce limited access at 
relatively low cost.  
  While the co-evolution of intensification, specialization, and consolidation are consistent 
with second-best theory, subsequent developments require third-best analysis. For example, 
while centralized governance was initially effective at resource conservation (under King 
Kamehameha I), the inherent opportunities for rent-seeking were exploited by King 
Kamehameha II (Liholiho) and subsequent rulers.  The intervention of Western culture and 
politics created an additional third-best force at odds with efficient institutional change. Western 
influence stressed the hierarchical system in at least two ways. First, it provided opportunities for 
specialization and trade beyond ahupua’a boundaries that were not readily captured under 
ahupua’a governance. Second, Western contact increased the benefits of extracting labor taxes 
from the commoners in order to import status goods.  
  32 The history of recent government regulation is a perfect illustration of what Coase calls 
blackboard economics. The Pigouvian solution for the open access problem would be tax fishing 
(or impose quantitative restrictions) and to simultaneously subsidize fish nurseries.  That is 
roughly what happened. What the blackboarders failed to realize was that there was private 
contracting alternative – ocean cage farming.  The nursery subsidies led to “dumping” fish at 
artificially low prices, which drove some of the early fish farmers out of business. 
The co-incidental use of both “private” konohiki fisheries and increasingly regulated, 
open access fisheries in the 19
th and 20
th centuries illustrates the role of non-convexities and 
externalities in the institutional governance of resource use.  Indeed, advances in aquaculture 
technology, such as cages, could have developed quite naturally out of the konohiki system 
described above.  They may have been delayed in Hawaii due to required changes in federal law 
granting leases and uncertainty about the existence of appropriate markets for fingerlings. By 
abstracting from non-convexities, the standard theory suggests that increased pressure on 
resources due to economic growth automatically contributes to the evolution from open access 
towards private or centralized control. 
To the extent that inter-district trade is facilitated by centralized control and decentralized 
decisions, two questions arise that may be suitable for further research. First, can the 
decentralization of decision-making evolve from the top-down system of medieval Europe or 
pre-contact Hawaii without violence or external force? Second, where decision-making is 
centralized as well as control, e.g. as in socialism, is it prudent to transition directly to 
decentralized exchange at the national level or is devolving central control to a sub-national level 
a useful intermediate step?  
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